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ENDOGENEITY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS
CURVE:AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES APPROACH
C.-Y. CYNTHIA LIN AND ZACHARY D. LISCOW
The effects of increasing income on environ-
mental quality is an issue that has long puzzled
economists. For over a decade, economists
have theorized that a graph of environmen-
tal degradation versus income often looks
something approximating an inverted-U shape,
dubbed the environmental Kuznets curve
(EKC) after Simon Kuznets’ work in the 1950s
and 1960s on income equality (Kuznets 1955,
1965). Among the reasons why economists
have found the effects of increasing income
on environmental quality so intriguing is that
the answers to this question would help
resolve fundamental issues concerning human-
ity’s ability to develop economically, while still
preserving the environment.
Some economists hypothesize that there is a
causal relationship between income and envi-
ronmental degradation, and that the relation
is in the shape of an inverted U: as countries
“get rich, … first [environmental] problems
increase, and then they decrease” (Lomborg
and Pope 2003, p.9). According to this theory,
the solution to environmental problems is to
alleviate poverty.
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Other economists agree with the shape of the
relationship between income and environmen-
tal degradation but disagree with the claim of
causality and, more importantly, with the con-
clusion that by mitigating poverty, one would
also improve environmental quality. Instead,
they suggest that there are very important
omitted variables, and that what cleaned up
the environment was not rising income, but
rather political institutions responding to pub-
lic demand (Lomborg and Pope 2003). As
Dasgupta and Maler (1995, p. 2412) state:“The
connection between environmental protection
and civil and political rights is a close one.
As a general rule, political and civil liberties
are instrumentally powerful in protecting the
environmental resource base, at least when
compared with the absence of such liberties in
countries run by authoritarian regimes.”
To examine the relationship between envi-
ronmental quality, income,and political institu-
tions, we use a multivariate regression analysis
of water pollution on income and institutional
variables. According to the results, evidence
for an inverted-U relationship between income
and environmental degradation were found for
seven out of eleven water pollutants. Polit-
ical institutions have a significant effect on
environmental quality for five of the eleven
pollutants.
The key innovation of this study is to use
instrumental variables to mitigate the prob-
lems caused by simultaneity bias and omit-
ted variable bias. For example, it is entirely
plausible that water pollution harms economic
development. Likewise, an omitted variable
such as a cultural or geographic factor may
affect both environmental quality and income.
Our study is important not only because of its
methodology, but also because its results will
expand the state of knowledge regarding the
consequences—especially on environmental
quality—of income, civil liberties and political
institutions.
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Data
For our measure of environmental quality, we
choose to focus on water. We choose water
because it seems the environmental variable
most likely to show the importance of polit-
ical institutions. Since water is probably the
most important and fought-over public good,
it is also the most politicized. As the ever-
expanding human population continues to
place increasing demands on the global water
supply, the issue of water quality is becoming
even more crucial.
We use data from the Global Environmental
Monitory System GEMS/Water dataset, which
consists of triennial surveys of water quality
statistics from 1979 to 1999 from across the
developed and developing world. This study
updates the data set used by Grossman and
Krueger (1995) and by Barrett and Graddy
(2000) to include the years from 1991 to 2000.
The data set consists of over 70,000 obser-
vations of dozens of different types of water
pollution, providing a substantive amount of
data on varied measures of water quality. Each
data point consists of the average over the
three years of one or more data point from
one of GEMS/water’s hundreds of sites around
the world.
Following Grossman and Krueger (1995),
we use the data on biological oxygen demand,
chemical oxygen demand, dissolved oxygen,
nitrate,arsenic, cadmium, lead,mercury,nickel,
total coliforms, and fecal coliform. All data is
in the form of concentrations of mg/l except
for the mercury data, which is in the form of
μg/l and the coliform data, which is in the
form of measured count/100 ml. The data set
also includes water temperature (in degrees
Celsius), which we use as control. The year
assigned to each data point is the middle of the
three years.
To this data, we add data on gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita at purchaser’s prices
in constant 2000 international dollars from
the World Development Indicators (WDI). We
also add GDP squared and GDP cubed.
For data on political mechanisms, we use
the indices on political rights and civil lib-
erties from Freedom House. Political rights
measures factors like the fairness of the elec-
toral process, the degree of political pluralism
and participation, and the presence of a non-
corrupt and transparent government (Freedom
House 2004). Civil liberties measures the free-
dom of expression and belief, the ability to
associate, the rule of law, and the degree of
individual autonomy. Each index varies from 1
to 7, with 1 meaning the most political rights or
civil liberties. For example, the United States
has a 1 in each category in all years, Indone-
sia has recently been in the middle of the
range, and China has a 7 in both categories
for most years. Freedom House attempts to
use a methodology not bound by culture, but
rather using standards drawn from the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (Freedom
House 2004).
Also from the World Development Indica-
tors (WDI), we add data on the percentage of
GDP that comes from manufacturing as a con-
trol. Also from the WDI dataset, we add an
age dependency ratio (dependents—the pop-
ulation under age 15 and above age 65—as a
proportion of the working age population) and
total debt service (% of GNI) as instruments.
Tables 1a and 1b in the online Appendix A
present summary statistics for our data set.1
Graphical analysis
In this section we examine the relationships
among environmental quality, income and
political institutions by graphical analysis. To
assess these relationships at an aggregate level,
we first pool the data over all years and all
countries to plot each of the eleven water qual-
ity variables versus income, political rights, and
civil liberties. There are thus 33 relationships
in total. The plots are available in the online
Appendix B.2 In order to see the nuances of
the data, we also subdivided the plots by coun-
try, by year, and by development level (OECD
versus non-OECD) for each of these 33 rela-
tionships. For example, the plots by country
allow easy understanding of which countries
lead to an inverted-U shape.
As seen from a summary of the patterns
gleaned from the exploratory plots presented
in table 2 in the online Appendix A, there
seems to be no connection between the type
of pollutant and the relationship between the
pollution’s concentration and the state of polit-
ical or economic development. However, there
are still several interesting trends.
The concentrations of the majority of the
pollutants (chemical oxygen demand, total
arsenic, dissolved oxygen, total lead, total
1 The online appendix A is available at: http://www.des.ucdavis.
edu/faculty/Lin/water_EKC_AppA.pdf.
2 The online appendix B is available at: http://www.des.ucdavis.
edu/faculty/Lin/water_EKC_AppB.pdf.
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nickel, and fecal coliform) are decreasing func-
tions of per capita income, political rights, and
civil liberties. The concentrations of only two
pollutants (total cadmium and nitrate) exhibit
increasing functions of per capita income,polit-
ical rights, and civil liberties. The concentra-
tions of three pollutants (biological oxygen
demand, total mercury, and total coliform)
show no relationship with the income or politi-
cal variables. Several of these trends are largely
dependent upon the observations from only
one or a few countries; for example, total
cadmium’s curve is dependent upon 1980s
UK and 1990s France data. This suggests that
water quality generally improves as countries
develop.
Only a few of the pollutants (chemical oxy-
gen demand, total arsenic, total mercury, and
total cadmium) potentially have an inverted-U
form for concentration with respect to income.
Interestingly, a few of the pollutants (biologi-
cal oxygen demand, chemical oxygen demand,
total lead, fecal coliform) appear to have an
inverted-U shape for the political variables
as well. The high amounts of pollution and
mid-range political variables for Mexico, India,
and Colombia cause this phenomenon for both
chemical and biological oxygen demand; this
is also reflected in the OECD versus non-
OECD plots, in which concentrations decrease
for OECD countries with improving political
institutions,while they increase for non-OECD
countries with improving political institutions.
These results suggest that, to the extent that
there is an EKC, it may be as much caused by
political as income factors.
In order to see the nuances of the data,
we also subdivided the plots in the online
appendix by country. As evidenced by these
plots, the shape of the relationships of each
pollutant with GDP, political rights and civil
liberties in the pooled plots is governed pri-
marily by the cross-sectional variation between
countries.They thus reflect cross-sectional vari-
ation in pollution levels between countries at
different points in their development paths,
rather than time series variation in pollution
levels within countries developing over time
either politically or economically. With few
exceptions (i.e. Ireland), the countries in this
dataset do not vary substantially in their GDP
or institutional indicators over the 20-year time
horizon of this dataset. Given that this study
uses a dataset over a longer period of time than
those used in many studies in the EKC liter-
ature, these results suggest that the EKC may
not truly reflect individual countries’ trajectory
over time,but instead perhaps other factors not
traditionally captured in the EKC literature.
Econometric Methodology
Our regression model is the following:
pollutionit = α0 + α1yit + α2y2it + α3y3it
+ α4prit + α5clit + x′itβ
+ εit ,
where pollutionit is the water pollutant concen-
tration for country i in year t, yit is country
i’s per capita GDP in year t, prit the political
rights index in country i in year t, clit is the
civil liberties index in country i in year t, and
xit is a vector of controls including population
density, water temperature, year, and manufac-
turing value added. The cubic trend in income
is consistent with previous studies (see e.g.,List
and Gallet 1999), while the addition of politi-
cal variables is less common. Allowing for the
possibility that a country’s political institutions
may have a lagged effect on pollution con-
centrations, we also run a model lagging the
political variables:
pollutionit = α0 + α1yit + α2y2it + α3y3it
+ α4pri,t−1 + α5cli,t−1
+ x′itβ + εit .
Finally, to control for any time-invariant unob-
servables that vary by country, we also run the
following fixed effects model:
pollutionit = α0 + α1yit + α2y2it + α3y3it
+ α4prit + α5clit + x′itβ
+ μi + εit ,
where μi is a country-specific fixed effect. A
fixed effects model is more appropriate than a
random effects model because the unobserv-
ables captured by the fixed effect are likely to
be correlated with the regressors.
In all the models above, a negative second
derivative of pollution with respect to income
for some range of income would be consistent
with an inverted-U shape:
∂2pollutionit
∂y2it
= 2α2 + 6α3yit < 0.
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If political institutions facilitate environmen-
tal improvement, we would expect a positive
coefficient on the political rights and civil lib-
erties indices, where lower values of the indices
indicate a stronger political institution.
There are two types of endogeneity prob-
lems that plague regressions of environmental
quality on institutional and income variables
and that have been largely ignored by pre-
vious literature on the subject. One type is
the simultaneity bias introduced by the reverse
causality of GDP and environmental degrada-
tion. While the increases in economic activity
that come along with increases in GDP may
increase pollution, increases in pollution may,
at the same time, harm people’s health, for
example, thereby reducing GDP. Output and
pollution may also be jointly produced in the
production process,causing GDP and pollution
to be simultaneously determined.
A second type of endogeneity problem arises
from omitted variable bias. While including
policy variables helps reduce the problem
of the endogeneity of GDP, it is still quite
plausible that a third variable jointly causes
both economic growth and environmental
degradation—perhaps cultural or geographic
factors not now in the regression formula.
In order to mitigate the problems of endo-
geneity, we innovate upon the previous liter-
ature by employing an instrumental variables
approach for the regressions both with and
without the fixed effects in order to identify the
coefficient on income.The instruments are debt
service and age dependency ratio.These instru-
ments are reasonably credible instruments for
GDP; while they are correlated with GDP, they
do not have an effect on environmental quality,
except through their effect on GDP. Total debt
service, which includes the principal repay-
ments and interest actually paid on debt, is
positively correlated with GDP because more
debt is likely to be paid off when GDP is higher.
Debt service may be correlated with types of
degradation like deforestation, if countries liq-
uidate natural assets to pay off debts, but there
is little reason to believe that countries with
high debts would pollute more. Countries with
a higher age dependency ratio will have lower
rates of growth and GDPs, both because coun-
tries with large populations of young are likely
to be less productive on average and because
poorer countries tend to have this demographic
profile.
For each of the 11 water pollutants, we
run five regressions. The first regression is
OLS where standard errors are clustered
by country. The second and third regres-
sions are instrumental variables (IV) gener-
alized method of moments (GMM) regres-
sions; the second regression uses the contem-
poraneous political variables and the third
regression uses the lagged political variables.
In both IV GMM regressions, per capita
GDP, per capita GDP squared and per capita
GDP cubed are instrumented with age depen-
dency ratio, total debt service, age depen-
dency ratio squared, total debt service squared,
age dependency ratio cubed and total debt
service cubed. For the IV GMM specifica-
tions, a robust weighting matrix that is opti-
mal when the error term is heteroskedastic is
used.
To address any potential weak instruments
problem, the fourth regression is a limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML)
regression using age dependency ratio and
total debt service as instruments for per capita
GDP. We report the LIML estimate and
a coverage-corrected standard error for the
coefficient on per capita GDP based on the
conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) approach
developed by Moreira (2003). Computation
of the conditional p-value for the CLR test
uses the algorithm of Andrews, Moreira, and
Stock (forthcoming). Andrews, Moreira, and
Stock (2004) showed that the CLR test is
approximately optimal. In particular, it dom-
inates the Anderson and Rubin (1949) test
and the Lagrange multiplier (score) test pro-
posed independently by Kleibergen (2002) and
Moreira (2001).
To capture any country-specific unobserv-
ables that are invariant over time, the fifth
regression is a fixed effects regression where
per capita GDP, per capita GDP squared and
per capita GDP cubed are instrumented with
age dependency ratio, total debt service, age
dependency ratio squared, total debt service
squared, age dependency ratio cubed and total
debt service cubed.
Regression Results
Before adjusting the standard errors, we test
for heteroskedasticity using a Breusch-Pagan
/ Cook-Weisberg test. For all pollutants, as
reported in table 4 in the online Appendix
A, we reject the null of constant variance.
We therefore need to adjust the standard
errors for heteroskedasticity. Thus, with OLS,
standard errors are clustered by country.
With IV GMM, we use a robust weighting








Lin and Liscow Endogeneity in the Environmental Kuznets Curve 5
matrix that is optimal when the error term is
heteroskedastic.
To compare the instrumental variables result
with OLS, we first run an OLS model for
each of the pollutants. The results are reported
as specification (1) in tables 4a-4k in the
online Appendix A. The OLS results show
no evidence for an inverted-U shaped rela-
tionship. However, the OLS results may be
biased since income owing to the endogeneity
of income.
For each pollutant, we conduct a Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test to test for the endogeneity
of income. This is a test of whether the resid-
ual from a regression of income on all the
exogenous variables has a significant coeffi-
cient when added to the original model. The
null hypothesis is that income is exogenous.
According to the results, income is endoge-
nous for the regressions of chemical oxygen
demand, dissolved oxygen, arsenic, and fecal
coliform. Thus, at least for these pollutants,
instrumental variables are needed to overcome
endogeneity.
Table 3 in the online Appendix A presents
the results of the first stage regression of per
capita GDP on the instruments and on the
other exogenous variables. The F-statistic for
the joint test of the instruments is 39.11 when
the exogenous variables include the contem-
poraneous political variables and 41.12 when
the exogenous variables include the lagged
political variables. The instruments are thus
correlated with the endogenous variable.
We use a Hansen overidentification test to
test whether the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term. As reported in table 4,
for all the pollutants for which we reject
exogeneity of per capita GDP (chemical oxy-
gen demand, dissolved oxygen, arsenic, and
fecal coliform) and therefore for which instru-
ments are needed, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorre-
lated with the error term, so the instruments
are admissible.
The results from the IV GMM specifications
in tables 4a-4k are robust to whether the politi-
cal variables are lagged (specification 3) or not
(specification 2).To address any potential weak
instruments problem, we run a conditional IV
LIML regression using age dependency ratio
and total debt service as instruments for per
capita GDP, and report the LIML estimate
and a coverage-corrected standard error for
the coefficient on per capita GDP. In contrast
with the OLS results, some pollutants show an
inverted-U relationship under the IV GMM
and conditional IV specifications. Pollutants
exhibiting an inverted-U relationship have a
cubic relationship with income, which leads to
both a peak and a trough.
When country fixed effects are included with
the IV estimation, some of the environmen-
tal Kuznets relationships go away. As with
the other IV results, pollutants exhibiting an
inverted-U relationship have a cubic relation-
ship with income, which leads to both a peak
and a trough. Table I lists, for each of the four
IV specifications, the peak of the EKC for pol-
lutants that exhibit an inverted-U relationship
under that specification.
Thus, according to the results, evidence for
an inverted-U relationship between income
and environmental degradation were found for
Table 1. Peaks for Pollutants Exhibiting an Inverted-U Relationship
IV GMM – lagged






$7228 $7234 $8170 Significant cubic term
Dissolved oxygen
Nitrate Significant linear term
Arsenic $9055 $10,883 No peak $12, 468
Cadmium $10, 000 $8937 $7927 No peak




Fecal coliform $4298 $4253 $4446 Significant linear term
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at least two out of the four IV specifications
for seven out of eleven water pollutants:
biological oxygen demand, chemical oxygen
demand, arsenic, cadmium, lead, nickel, and
fecal coliform. For these pollutants, there is
both a peak and a trough. The IV results
therefore provide some support for an envi-
ronmental Kuznets curve in global water qual-
ity. In contrast, the OLS results, which do
not address the endogeneity of income, show
no inverted-U relationship for any of the
pollutants.
The results also provide some evidence for
the importance of political institutions. The
political indicators have a statistically signifi-
cant effect on water pollution in at least two IV
specifications for five out of eleven pollutants:
nitrate, arsenic, cadmium, lead, and mercury.
The direction of the effect varies by pollu-
tant and political variable. For some pollutants,
political institutions have a positive effect on
water pollution; for others,political institutions
have a negative effect. For some pollutants, the
two political variables have opposite effects on
water pollution.
Conclusions
This study is suggestive of a likely shape of
the water quality-income relationship and also
of the importance of political institutions. The
key innovation is the use of instrumental vari-
ables and country-specific fixed effects in our
econometric methodology. Evidence for an
inverted-U relationship between income and
environmental degradation were found for
seven out of eleven water pollutants. Political
institutions have a significant effect on environ-
mental degradation for five out of eleven water
pollutants.
For international donors trying to improve
the lives of the world’s poor, while improv-
ing the environment they inhabit, this study
offers a few implications. First, at least with
some of the water pollutants, political institu-
tions matter. Second, this study suggests that
water quality may affect income to a sig-
nificant extent, as evidenced by the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman tests and the instrumental vari-
ables regressions. If accurate, then this study
provides more evidence for why water sup-
plies should be protected and cleaned—it may
help countries gain more income. Finally, the
relationships between environmental degrada-
tion, income and political institutions found
in this study suggest that those in the field
and academia should be open to relationships
between these key components of sustainable
development.
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